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arbitrary classification which is under-inclusive' 3 if, as is generally the
case, these benefits could be commuted to a lump sum payment. Sim-
ilarly, this argument would extend to statutes which include only cer-
tain disabilities under workmen's compensation as "disqualifying in-
come." Indeed, it could be held in conjunction with Fox, that this
further refinement of the class, based on a type of disability, is not
reasonably related to the purpose of the duplicity-of-payment statutes.' 4
: The holding of Fox does not answer the question of whether or not
benefits under workmen's compensation should be awarded concur-
rently with benefits under unemployment insurance. Its significance
lies in its recognition of the fact that statutes denying such duplicity
may be held to create an unreasonable classification. As long as work-
men's compensation statutes allow lump sum payments, but considerthe benefits derived thereunder to be "disqualifying income" only when
received during the week in which unemployment insurance is sought,
this unreasonable classification will necessarily exist.
MIc HAEL CoLLNs
Agency-RIGHT OF REAL ESTATE BROKER To ComMissioN FRom
SELLER. In Ells'worth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,' plaintiff, a real estate
broker, sought to recover from his client, the seller, - a brokerage com-
13. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, supra note 5, at
348-53.
14. The court pointed out that:
"[T]he classifications made in section 27(n) of the Employment Security
Act between those partially and permanently disabled and those under the
specific loss provisions of The Workmen's Compensation Act fail to treat
all within the class equally, as section 27(n) allows benefits under both
The Employment Security "Act and The Workmen's Compensation Act
for one suffering a specific loss and yet denies the same to one perma-
nently and partially disabled." 379 Mich. 579 at -, 153 N.W.2d 644, 649
(1967).
1. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
2. The seller impleaded the buyer, and the judgment in the trial court was against
both. The jury found for plaintiff against the buyer on the basis of a breach of
an implied promise on the part of the buyer to complete the purchase and thereby
enable the broker to earn his commission. Ruling on this aspect of the case, the
court held that where the buyer had solicited the help of the broker in finding land,
and knew that the broker expected to get his commission from the seller on com-
pletion of the sale, the buyer was liable to the broker for the commission he would
have earned. See Eells Bros. v. Parsons, 132 Iowa 543, 109 N.W. 1098 (1906); Tanner
v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 161 A.2d 725 (1960).
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mission allegedly due him under a contract of sale' which had ulti-
mately failed because of the inability of the buyer to pay the purchase
price at the time for closing title. The trial court held for the plaintiff,
but the appellate court reversed, holding that the liability of the seller
to the broker was a question of fact for the jury.4 The Supreme Court
of New Jersey granted certification in order to consider the fairness of
continuing a rule under which a seller is held liable to his broker for a
commission as of the time he enters into a contract with a potential
buyer, whether or not the buyer ever actually completes the trans-
action.5
Basing its decision on public policy," the court held as a matter of
law that where title does not pass solely because of the unjustified re-
fusal or financial inability of the buyer, the broker is not entitled to
recover his commission from the seller.7
In thus holding, the court limited the application of the rule of Hinds
3. The contract provided that the actual payment of the commission would be
made in installments as the purchase price was paid. The commission was payable
"in consideration of services rendered in consummating this sale." 50 N.J. at 528,
236 A.2d at 843. Under the general rule applicable, the seller could be held liable for
the commission regardless of whether or not the sale was consummated. Freeman
v. Van Wagen, 90 N.J.L. 358, 101 A. 55 (1917); Winter v. Toldt, 32 NJ. Super.
443, 108 A.2d 648 (1954); See Lippincott v. Content, 123 NJ.L. 277, 8 A.2d 362
(1939) (where similar language was interpreted to mean that closing of title was a
condition precedent to the broker having a right to his commission). The question
in these cases would ordinarily seem to be whether the words impose a condition
precedent or merely fix the date on which payment is to be made. In Dobbs, the
court disregarded language of the contract which stated the terms of payment of
the commission.
4. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 92 N.J. Super. 271, 223 A.2d 199 (1966).
5. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, cert. granted 48 N.J. 354, 225 A.2d 365 (1966),
aff'd on other grounds, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
6. The court's holding in the principal case was no doubt greatly influenced by its
past expansion of the area of public policy into other commercial fields. Its language
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), is of telling
impact:
[T]he gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer
in the automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition
among car makers in the area of express warranty. Where can the buyer
go to negotiate better protection? Such control and limitation of his
remedies are inimical to the public welfare and, at the very least, call
for great care by the courts to avoid injustice through application of
strict common law principles of freedom of contract. Id. at 87.
See Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 NJ. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955); Rein-
hardt v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank, 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951);
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932).
7. 50 NJ. 528, 236 A.2d 843.
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v. Henry,8 the clearly prevailing American view.9 This majority rule
had grown out of the strict application of fundamental principles of
contract and agency in litigation involving the seller-broker relation.10
Following those principles, courts have held that a real estate broker is
entitled to his commission when he has produced a buyer who is ready,
willing, and able to buy on terms set by the seller; and therefore the
seller cannot, by any unjustified act of his own, defeat the broker's
right to a commission." In this respect, the courts have alternately
taken the position that the buyer must either be ready, willing, and
able at the time he is introduced to the seller, 2 or at the time he and
the seller enter into a valid, enforceable contract of sale.' 3
Where such a contract exists, it is held that, by the act of entering
into the contract, the seller impliedly makes his own independent de-
termination of the willingness and financial ability of the buyer to com-
8. 36 N.J.L. 328 (1873). In this case, the court had held that:
The right of the broker to commission is complete, when he has pro-
cured a purchaser able and willing to conclude a bargain on the terms
on which the broker was authorized to sell. When such a purchaser is
produced, the principal cannot defeat the agent's right to compensation
by a refusal, without sufficient reason, to fulfill the agreement which the
agent had power to make. Id. at 332.
That this language could be used as the basis of a rule which would allow the
broker to recover even in a case where the seller is without fault and powerless
to enforce the contract, indicates that courts, in applying the rule, have been pre-
occupied with protecting the broker. In New Jersey, this rule has received what
may be extreme extension in Blau v. Friedman, 26 N.J. 397, 140 A.2d 193 (1958)
and Freeman v. Van Wagen, 90 N.J.L 358, 101 A. 55 (1917).
9. See McGavock v. Woodlief, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 221 (1858); O'Glee v. Trigg,
271 F.Supp. 121 (E.D. Ark., 1967); E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency v. Lewis,
62 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 1967); Spratlin, Harrington & Thomas,
Inc. v. Hawn, 116 Ga. App. 175, 156 S.E.2d 402 (1967); C. 0. Frick v. Baetzel, 71
Ohio App. 301, 47 N.E.2d 1019 (1942); 10 WiumstoN ON CoNra.Acrs, sec. 1287 (3rd
ed. 1967); REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY, sec. 445 (d) (1), 448 (1957); 1 MEcHEM, A
TRa-rsE ON TE LAw OF AGENCY, sec. 966 (4th ed. 1889).
10. The foundation of the rationale of the general rule is the concept of the broker
as a middleman whose only duty is to bring the parties together. Id., sec. 966 at
793, 797.
11. See Dotson v. Milliken, 209 U.S. 237 (1908); Bechtel Properties, Inc. v. Blanken,
299 F.2d 1928 (C.A. D.C.) aff'g 194 F. Supp. 638 (D. D.C., 1961); Hinds v. Henry,
36 N.J.L. 328 (1873).
12. See Freeman v. Van Wagen, 90 N.J.L. 358, 101 A. 55 (1917); Alnor Const. Co.
v. Herchet, 10 NJ. 246, 90 A.2d 14 (1952); Libowitz v. Lake Nursing Home, Inc,
35 Wis.2d 74, 150 N.W.2d 439 (1967).
13. See Hedden v. Folio, 62 N.J. Super. 470, 163 A.2d 163 (1960); C.O. Frick Co.
v. Baetzel, 71 Ohio App. 301, 47 N.E.2d 1019 (1942).
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plete the sale,'14 thus discharging the broker from further responsi-
bility.15 Such a theory therefore places the burden of determining the
willingness and ability of the buyer, as well as the risk of his non-
performance, squarely upon the seller.
The ultimate effect of Ells'worth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson"6 is to
shift this burden and risk from the seller to the broker. The court ex-
pressly rejected, as neither fair nor reasonable, the proposition that the
seller, merely by entering into a contract, impliedly uses his own inde-
pendent judgment to determine the buyer's willingness and ability to
perform. Instead, the court felt that the "real relationship" between
seller and broker is that of a seller who is relatively ignorant of the
commercial and legal implications of the modem land transaction, as
opposed to the broker who is ordinarily trained, licensed, and ex-
perienced. The application of the rule of Hinds v. Henry17 is thus
limited to those cases where the seller himself is not without fault.
The decision in Dobbs not only places a restriction on a rule which
had been extended beyond its just limits, s but in addition represents a
14. See Bechtel Properties, Inc. v. KIanken, 299 F.2d 928 (CA. D.C.), aftg, 194
F. Supp. 638 (D. D.C., 1961).
15. See Martino v. Palladino, 143 Conn. 547, 123 A.2d 872 (1956); De Harpport v.
Green, 215 Ore. 281, 333 P.2d 900, (1959); MECHEM, supra note 9.
16. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843.
17. 36 NJ.L. 328. In such cases the rule of Hinds v. Henry may still be fol-
lowed. Thus, where a purchaser procured by a broker enters into a valid, enforce-
able contract with the seller and subsequently proves unwilling or unable to con-
summate the sale, the rule of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson would apply, but
where such a contract is made, and the buyer remains at all times willing and able
to perform, but the seller without justification refuses to complete the sale, the
court could apply Hinds v. Henry with a just result.
Inasmuch as a legally unjustified refusal or inability to pay on the part of the
buyer will be, under Dobbs, a complete defense to an action by the broker against
the seller, New Jersey brokers will be pressed to seek greater protection from pro-
visions in brokerage agreements. But the court's pronouncement against standard form
contracts and provisions which reflect grossly unequal bargaining capacities will most
likely inhibit such efforts. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843.
18. See Sweet v. H.R. Howenstein, 60 D.C. App. 20 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Mitidiere
v. Saito, 246 Cal.2d 535, 54 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1966); Rividell v. Rago, 215 Cal.2d 614,
30 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1963); Goldgar v. North Fulton Realty Co., 106 Ga. App. 459,
127 S.E. 2d 189 (1962); Shaw v. Chiles, 9 Ga. App. 450, 71 S.E. 747 (1911); Murphy
v. Brown, 252 Iowa 764, 108 N.W.2d 353 (1961); Treigle v. Patrick, 138 So.2d 652
(La. App., 1962); Riggs v. Turnbill, 105 Md. 135, 66 A. 13 (1907); Keener v. Har-
rod, 2 Md. 63, 56 Am. Dec. 706 (1852); Cunningham v. Garber, 361 Mich. 90, 104
N.W.2d 746 (1960); Gartner v. Higgins, 214 A.2d 849 (R.I., 1965); Butler v. Barker,
17 R.I. 582, 23 A. 1019 (1892). The new state of Hawaii appears to have followed
the rule in the principal case. Ikeoka v. Kong, 47 Hawaii 220, 386 P.2d 855 (1963).
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break in the traditional preoccupation of the courts with the protec-
tion of the broker, and is a further step in a growing trend toward
protection of the consumer in his dealings with commercial specialists
whose services are required but not understood.
TERRY B. LIGHT
Constitutional Law-FREE SPEECH-PUBLIC TRANSIT ADVERTISING.
In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist.,1 an association
known as "Women for Peace" sought to buy bus advertising space
to place a message advocating a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam
War.2 Defendant transit company refused the request, stating that their
policy was to allow only commercial advertisements for the sale of
goods and services, except during elections.3 An action was brought
by the association alleging that defendants' refusal had deprived them
of their rights of free speech and equal protection under the First4 and
Fourteenth5 Amendments to the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals rejected the association's allegations, finding
that the defendants' advertising policy was neither arbitrary nor dis-
criminatory but rather in the public interest.' The California Supreme
Court, in reversing the lower court's decision, held that by allowing
commercial advertising, the transit district had opened their facilities
as a "forum for the expression of ideas," and therefore they could not
1. 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982 (1967).
2. The text of the proposed advertisement was:
"Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind."
President John F. Kennedy.
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam.
Women for Peace
P.O. Box 944, Berkeley.
id., at 432, 434 P.2d at 984.
S. Id. Defendants were a public transit district and a private corporation. The
corporation leased advertising space from the district and re-leased it to advertisers
under an agreement where advertisements on controversial subjects were not accept-
able unless approved by the district.
4. U.S. Cosr. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press. .. "
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: ... nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 61 Cal. Rptr. 419 (Ct. App. 1967).
